Establishment of the EEA with a court for the EFTA Countries ten years ago gives an opportunity to examine more facets of interrelations between courts and legal orders of different jurisdictions. The EEA differs from the Community legal order in that it is constructed as an agreement under public international law without the referrals of power included in the EC-treaty. On the other hand, the object of the agreement is to mirror the law of the Single Market into the relations between the EFTA states and the EC. In the reception of the jurisprudence of the EFTA Court and the ECJ, the Norwegian Supreme Court does not distinguish according to legal obligations, but seems to take an approach similar to national courts in Member States of the EU.
Introduction
(c) the settlement of disputes between two or more EFTA States.
We see here that the EEA agreement does not go further than to demand the establishment of a court with the functions often attributed to an international tribunal, which is disputes between states, and disputes with regard to actions of institutions established in an international treaty.
The jurisdiction of the court is defined in article 31(2) SCA which states that if a State concerned does not comply with a reasoned opinion of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the latter may bring the matter before the EFTA Court, and in article 32 that the EFTA Court In such matters as here described, the contacting states have given binding powers to the Court under international law. The EFTA States concerned by a ruling shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgments of the EFTA Court and if an action against a decision the EFTA Surveillance Authority is well founded, the decision of shall be declared void.
Reaching further than the obligation under the EEA-agreement, the SCA agreement Article 34 states that the EFTA Court shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. This type of procedure is modelled on Article 234 EC where the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of community law. The main differences between the two procedures are that the ECJ gives rulings, and the fact that if any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the ECJ.
There is no provision in the EEA-agreement or the SCA-Agreement providing that the case law of the EFTA-Court should have status as precedents when deciding later cases of law.
The doctrine of precedents in community law is not explicitly stated in the EC-treaty, but is generally inferred from Article 220 which states that the ECJ shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed and Article 292 where the Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein. Read together these provisions state that the ECJ rules according to the law, and that it is for the Court alone to decide on the law. agreement, the Court of the European Economic Area is under a duty to interpret the provisions of the agreement in the light of the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice given prior to the date of signature of the agreement, the Court of the European Economic Area will no longer be subject to any such obligation in the case of decisions given by the Court of Justice after that date. Consequently, the agreement's objective of ensuring homogeneity of the law throughout the European Economic Area will determine not only the interpretation of the rules of the agreement itself but also the interpretation of the corresponding rules of Community law It follows that in so far as it conditions the future interpretation of the Community rules on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital and on competition the machinery of courts provided for in the agreement conflicts with Article 164 of the EEC Treaty and, more generally, with the very foundations of the Community. As a result, it is incompatible with Community law." failure to act cases, a number corresponding very well with the composition of the cases before the EFTA court. 4 In comparing the first 10 years of the EFTA-court with the first 10 years of the ECJ, we find that the case-load of the ECJ was higher and increased more rapidly. Starting with the entry into force of the EEC treaty in 1958, the ECJ received a total of 464 cases, that is 77 pr.
Member state, compared to the 18 pr. Contracting Party received by the EFTA-court. 5 A vast majority of the ECJ-cases were direct actions, many probably connected with the ECSCtreaty. As mentioned above, it has been shown in other studies that very few cases from the What is striking in this table is not a difference in the supply of cases to the two courts, but the way Austria differs from the other countries in the amount of requests for preliminary rulings. Although there seems to be a correlation between the number of requests and the population of a country, the number of requests from Austria far exceeds what can be explained by differences in the size of the population alone.
If we look at the other countries of the EU, we see that the number of preliminary rulings lodged before the Court, is not by any means evenly distributed between the Member states.
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Big players are above all Germany, but also the rest of the original six. Austria certainly belongs to this league although its total number of cases is low due to the small number of years it has been a member. On the other hand, a Denmark has a very low rate, averaging 3 cases a year, without any tendency pointing towards an increase in this rate in the latest years.
Britain must be put in the same league with a very low number of cases when the size of the population is taken into account.
If we look at the EEA as a whole, we see clearly that the different states fall in different groups with one group characterised by a large and increasing amount of requests from the national courts, and another group with a constant low amount of requests. All the Nordic countries fall in the latter group. This conforms to what has been observed regarding they diverge in how the various EEA countries resolve conflicts with the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. In general, the larger member states have more conflicts and they use court rulings more frequently than the EU average in settling these conflicts. By contrast, the smaller states in general and in particular the Nordic states, have fewer conflicts and they resolve them at an earlier stage and less frequently through the use of court rulings.
7
The findings also conform with previous studies on variations in the patterns of references to the ECJ form different Member states.
8
The findings seem to suggest that differences between the two courts regarding matters like legal basis, history, recruitment, workload and duration of proceedings, at least taken together, do not seem to influence the supply of referrals from national courts. A closer examination shows that there are no consistent differences between EU countries and EFTA countries. However, here the picture of the Nordic states as a separate, coherent group does not fit. A pattern that seems to emerge, however, is that there are higher amounts of referrals from courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy from countries whose legal system operates with specialised courts and courts of last instance. In general, features of the national legal culture and structure of the court system condition the relationship between national courts and a supra-national tribunal. 10 The pattern we see in referral ratio between higher and lower courts therefore fits well into the more general picture of factors determining the role of national courts in European integration.
From countries with a unified court system with only one court of last instance, like Denmark, Iceland, Norway and UK, the amount of references from the court of last instance is lower. This does not necessarily mean that these courts take their obligation to refer less seriously than more specialised appeal courts. It is likely that the total number of cases reaching a court of last instance is higher in a country with several, specialised appeal courts than in a country with only one, general supreme court. This is consistent with the thesis of Stone Sweet and Brunell: The more any given court deals with questions of EC law, the more that court is likely to interact with the ECJ in a constructive manner. 11 There are simply more high-level courts dealing extensively with community law in a specialized court system than 
The Norwegian Reception

In numbers
The Supreme Court of Norway (Høyesterett) has mentioned the EFTA Court in its judgements in 21 cases. 12 In 14 of these cases, the EFTA-court is mentioned in relation to procedural matters in internal Norwegian law (mostly legal standing, non referral of injunctions for interim protection and awarding of costs). This means that the Supreme Court refers to the jurisprudence of the EFTA-court as a source of law in 7 cases. In 3 of these, the EFTA-court had given an advisory opinion in the case. 13 Of the remaining 4, 3 concern transfer of undertakings, where there is an extensive jurisprudence from both the EFTA-court and the ECJ which the court refers to. 14 The last case is a case of the right of compensation of a commercial agent after termination of the contract of agency. 15 The legal question involves interpretation of directive 86/653/EEC on the coordination of the laws of the Member State relating to self-employed commercial agents. The Supreme Court states that there is no relevant jurisprudence from the EFTA-court or the ECJ, and goes on to interpret Norwegian law on the background of article 17(2) of the directive. The Court has dealt with similar issues in two previous cases, without any mention being made of the two EEA-courts at all. 16 We can compare these figures with the way by which the Supreme Court deals with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, which can be found in a total of 27 cases. 17 In all cases where use is 12 Based on searches made in the Lovdata data base September 2004 with search words "EFTA domstol", "EF domstol", "EØS", "rådsforordning" and "rådsdirektiv". made of jurisprudence from the EFTA-court, reference is also made to jurisprudence of the ECJ.
In 6 of the 27 cases, parties have argued from the jurisprudence on protection of fundamental rights that similar protection should be given within Norwegian law. 18 The legal issues in these cases fall outside the scope of the EEA-agreement, and the argument has been that Based on these examples, it seems that the Supreme Court takes the same approach to cases from the ECJ as to its own precedents according to the Norwegian theory of sources of law. If precedents are lacking, it investigates whether there are cases in issues similar to the one in hand, and seeks whatever guidance these give on aims and concepts of the relevant rules. In the total lack of cases, the issue is decided by reference to other national sources. Judged at face value, this seems to be an approach far from the one expected by a court of last instance under community law. It would in my view, not be unfounded to claim that the Supreme Court has shown a certain reluctance to refer issues to the EFTA Court under the advisory 21 Rt. 1996 p. 1569, 1995 p. 1789 and 1977 p. 1859. 22 "A court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has been established the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice or that the correct application of community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community. A main feature of the legal situation of the EFTA-court is that it is not provided with exclusive rights to interpret the EEA agreement in relation to the EFTA-states. As we have seen from the review of EEA cases by the Supreme Court, the Court regards itself both formally competent and substantially qualified to interpret provisions of EEA law. On the other hand, even not under a strict obligation to follow the advisory opinions of the EFTA Court, the Supreme Court has set the requirements to diverge from these opinions so strictly, that it in practise amounts to an obligation to follow them. 
Effects on the Legal order
Initially, the EEA-agreement was concluded as an agreement under international law. One of the basic aims of the agreement was to connect the EFTA states to the single European market without constructing supranational institutions and rules. 32 The way the agreement has been developed both by the EFTA Court and national courts has brought the differences between the EEA solution and Community law in this respect to be more of degree than of a qualitative nature. One aspect of this is the relations of the national courts to the EEA courts,
where we see that there are no great differences in the approach of the national courts. The fact that the Supreme Court has accepted that the loyalty obligation also applies to the courts is of crucial importance. This duty entails a duty to cooperate with the EFTA-Court, to apply EEA-rules in a loyal manner and, when necessary to ensure that other national authorities apply the agreement and comply with it. In Community law it can be held that basic features such as disallowing state authorities to rely on national laws which are inconsistent with Community obligations (direct effect and supremacy), the interpretation obligation and the duty to give effective remedies to breach of Community law all stem from the duties of national courts under article 10 EC. The crucial test, however, is how EEA-rules fare in conflict with legislative acts of Stortinget, where there is a clear legislative intent that the act shall prevail over an EEA obligation. In the community context, the House of Lords has made a contractual argument towards Community law: Joining the EU means joining on the terms that are made, and supremacy and exclusive competence of the ECJ are parts of these terms. This must entail that the state also in the capacity of legislator is bound by the terms, and therefore cannot pick and choose which obligations to subscribe to while still remaining in the Community. And is it not the duty of the courts to uphold the law also in the face of unlawful acts by the legislator?
The Court could of course take the more withdrawn position indicated by the majority of the Supreme Court in Finanger; it is up to the legislator to fulfil its obligations to implement EEA rules and it must therefore also be up to the legislator to sort out any difficulties that may arise. In Finanger this was a viable position because no court is under the obligation to 
Assessment
Looking back 10 years, the EEA-agreement has elements today, which were lacking, or even rejected at the moment of its inception. The Agreement was created as an instrument under international law, and as a clear alternative to the supranational arrangement of the, at that time, European Communities. Basic elements of community law as a legal order, the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals, with main characteristics such as the overall aim of integration, direct effect, state liability and the obligatory leading interpretive role of the ECJ, did not form part of the agreement. 45 Today the individuals and economic operators are able to rely on their rights before the courts, the aims of interpretation identical through the EEA aim of homogeneity, direct effect, supremacy and state liability established through interpretation and the leading role of the ECJ and the EFTA court accepted through the conduct of national courts.
Attaining the aims of the agreement, equal conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous European Economic Area, was probably impossible within the political constraints given at the time of the negotiations. The provisions included in the agreement to secure homogenous interpretation have the form of a request, rather than an obligation on the cooperating national and international courts. 46 The response has been positive. The two EEA courts have actively been cooperating in forming a uniform legal order. National courts have by no means been passive recipients, but have actively participated by making references at the same level as courts in the EU member states, by adhering to the interpretations of the ECJ, taking no notice of the distinction made in article 6 EEA, and by setting the conditions for disregarding the advisory opinions of the EFTA Court so strictly that following them amounts to an obligation. In this way the development of the EEA agreement mirrors the development of Community law where the "rules of the game" for the courts to play have largely been developed by the ECJ and the national courts in concert. 47 Above it was shown that on the level of statistics, the role of the EFTA Court and its relation to national Courts is comparable to the situation within Community law. European integration. 51 Based on this, one would maybe expect a higher degree of reluctance in Norwegian courts.
One factor in the explanation is probably the traditional strong loyalty Norwegian Courts have towards the legislation of the Storting and the expressed will of the legislator.
Paradoxically, this has brought the Courts into a position where they may question, and even disapply legislation passed by the same Storting. In Finanger, the court referred to the will of the legislator in the passing of the EEA implementation act as a strong argument for the duty of the courts to interpret Norwegian law in conformity with EEA obligations. Homogeneity is a strong legislative and political aim, and the EEA agreement the only viable alternative to achieve this. This places a responsibility also on the courts to ensure that this alternative functions.
Another factor is the familiarity of the Norwegian legal culture to the doctrine of precedents 
